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Joe Biden’s election has raised many expectations. However, due to long-
established legacies and predominant bipartisan consensus around the 
United States’ Western Hemisphere policy, changes will be in tone rather 
than in substance. Four topics will shape the agenda.
 • Post-COVID-19 reconstruction: With the pandemic raging across the region, 
a return to a “business as usual” approach will not meet the Latin American 
people’s urgent economic, political, and social needs. COVID-19 has further 
brought to light the region's structural problems, including but not limited to 
poverty, inequality, and insecurity.
 • Migration: Biden has promised to boost the resources sent to Central American 
countries by USD 4 billion in the hope of reducing immigration to the US. The 
president wants to carry out a so-far-abstract and light migration reform as 
well. However, there is no discernible strategy to deal with the rest of the hemi-
sphere’s challenges (e.g. the Venezuelan crisis).
 • Democracy: Not every president is happy with the election’s result. From Mex-
ico to Brazil, passing through Central America, some governments identified 
with Donald Trump’s confrontational rhetoric and profited from his disregard 
for their internal affairs. Among them, far-right leaders fear the end of the “free 
pass” granted to their heavy-handed and anti-democratic words and deeds. 
 • Regional and global scenario: in the context of China’s increasing economic and 
diplomatic presence in the region, Biden’s appeal to restore US “hemispheric 
leadership” appears hollow.
Policy Implications
Trump’s actions and the political cleavages he helped deepen have turned the US 
into a less reliable partner. As a consequence, Latin America will have to find 
its own answers, and new strategic partners to implement them. The region is 
essentially alone in weathering the COVID-19 and the structural problems the 
crisis exacerbates. In this context, Latin America and the European Union will 
need to undertake more relevant, autonomous joint strategic initiatives or resign 
themselves to being bystanders in others’ commercial, technological, and geopol-




German Institute for Global and 
Area Studies (GIGA)
Leibniz-Institut für Globale  
und Regionale Studien



















   2    GIGA FOCUS | LATIN AMERICA | NO. 1 | MARCH 2021 
Trump’s Nefarious Legacies 
Biden will have to face many challenges in his relationship to Latin America. One of 
the first ones is the damaging legacy the Trump administration left. Trump’s policy 
toward Latin America can be summarised in four words: migration, NAFTA (North 
American Free Trade Agreement), Venezuela, and Cuba. Alternatively, in three: 
disinterest, ignorance, and racism. Trump only ever visited Latin America once as 
president. Even then, it was only for the G20 summit. He also cancelled his parti-
cipation in the Hemispheric Summit of the Americas with three days to go, being 
the first US president to do so. All this signalled his chronic lack of interest in the 
region. In contrast Obama travelled to Latin America 15 times (Dannemann 2018).
Starting with his first presidential campaign, Trump identified trade with Me-
xico and migration from Central America as the two most important issues on his 
bilateral regional agenda. There was no policy for his relations with Latin America, 
beyond imperialistic references by his administration to the Monroe Doctrine’s re-
turn. Hence, NAFTA’s renegotiation and Mexico’s instrumentalisation as a buffer 
for migration were the first items on his strong-arm North American agenda. More-
over, he forced the Central American countries to accept a third country – namely, 
Mexico – as their refuge. The Trump administration also suspended the protected 
status of Salvadorans and Hondurans in the US, stopped the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), and attempted to phase the latter out. Further more, 
the images of children in cages forcefully separated from their families shocked 
the world. To the detriment of relations with the region, Trump paradoxically cut 
aid to Central American countries – accusing them of not doing enough to prevent 
migration to the US. 
As globally, the Trump administration negatively impacted inter-American and 
South American multilateralism. The epitome of this was breaking with the norm 
that the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) always had a Latin American pre-
sident. It was breached with Mauricio Claver-Carone’s election in 2020 for a six-
year term, despite the protest of various Latin American countries, Claver-Carone’s 
lack of experience, and his overly McCarthyist positions.
On the other hand, after two unfounded accusations of facilitating Cuban doc-
tors’ arrival and wanting to “strengthen” the island nation, Brazil and the US with-
drew funding from the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). Thus they left it 
defenceless and underfunded when it came to providing support to Latin American 
countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Furthermore, in keeping with his global discourse, Trump pointed to China’s 
growing economic presence in the region as a threat to US security. That is why he 
launched the “Growth in the Americas” initiative to facilitate and incentivise the US 
private sector’s investment in Latin American energy and infrastructure projects. 
Some saw it as a counterweight to global Chinese infrastructure projects (such as 
the Belt and Road Initiative) and the latter’s massive loans to and investment in the 
region. Nonetheless, the US initiative’s impact has been non-existent so far.
During his recent re-election campaign, Trump’s priority was attack on Vene-
zuela and Cuba via a Cold War-style speech. With it, he tried to secure the Latino 
vote in Florida. He accused Biden of being a Castro-Chavista socialist. Regarding 
his Venezuelan policy, he played his most critical cards quickly and without visible 
results: the recognition of Juan Guaidó as president of Venezuela as well as the oil 
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embargo. These moves did not bring any substantial change other than the worsen-
ing of the Venezuelan population’s already-impoverished condition. 
Concerning Cuba, the Trump administration reversed the measures advanced 
by Obama to restore relations with the island nation. He imposed more sanctions 
on remittances and restrictions on the travel of US citizens to the country. More-
over, with a few days left in office, he arbitrarily returned Cuba to the list of coun-
tries sponsoring terrorism. To be sure, even with claims to be set to reverse some of 
these measures and advance à la Obama, we should not expect Biden to go further 
than that. 
Beyond his words and deeds, Trump’s defeat might affect a blow to far-right 
Latin American leaders who have lost their most important ideological ally. 
The Inertia of United States Latin American Policy
There is no doubt that Joe Biden’s administration means a change of tone in the 
United States–Latin America and the Caribbean relationship. He has pledged to 
correct Donald Trump’s neglect and incompetence in the region. However, tones 
and shades of meaning will not suffice if his purpose is to rise to the challenge of 
becoming a real partner for Latin American countries. We should remember that 
Biden himself has also expressed racist positions in the past and already after being 
sworn in, even if he has not tried to capitalize this politically as Trump did. For 
instance, when asked about African-American and Latino citizens low vaccination 
rate, he claimed that it was because they did not know how to get online to schedule 
their appointments. Years ago, he also was amid a polemic for claiming that then-
senator Obama was the “…first mainstream African-American who is articulate and 
bright and clean and a nice-looking guy” (CNN 2007). Political commentators al-
most unanimously claim that he will pay more attention to the region. They argue 
that he represents the US president with the greatest knowledge of and experience 
in the area since the end of the Cold War. 
Nevertheless, experience does not necessarily mean interest – especially when 
it comes to overcoming structural tendencies and bipartisan agreements to bring 
about significant change. Although the US continues to be the leading great power 
in the region, it has been retreating from Latin America since long before Trump 
appeared on The Apprentice (Vera, Defelipe, and Castro 2017). Beyond rhetoric, it 
is clear that the region has fallen down the US’s external agenda. Nevertheless, the 
US continues to be the region’s main trade partner. In 2019, it was also the second-
largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) after the European Union (CEPAL 
2020a: 41–42). 
In that context, after many clashes with George W. Bush, the election of Obama 
brought high expectations for a different and more engaged hemispheric policy. In 
that regard there were milestones, such as the US–Cuba rapprochement in 2015, 
meeting a virtually unanimous demand from the region – raised along with the 
non-delivered embargo’s lifting. However in many other aspects, such as a renewed 
migration and drug-policy approach, it fell short. For instance, then vice president 
Biden attempted to dissuade Colombia, Guatemala, and Mexico from proposing a 
change in the global drug policy that would clash with the US’s prohibitionism at 
the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem 
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of 2016. Nevertheless, his recent remark that no one should go to prison for using 
drugs could at least create a more permissive environment for the Latin American 
countries that want to address drug policy as a public health issue and not as cri-
minal policy one. 
In short, there are reasons to be quite cautious about overwhelming change in 
US Latin American policy – that is, not to oversell the impact of a shift in tone. Con-
versely, the more leftist actors both inside and outside the Democratic Party that 
supported Biden’s election might pressure his administration for more substantial 
policy changes. That is where we should look for potential innovations. 
Biden’s Road Ahead: A Divided Country, a Polarised Hemisphere
Biden has a rutted road ahead both at home and abroad. The wounds to the US’s 
international image and alliances are here to stay, as is the radicalisation of the 
far-right groups that supported Trump. These two fronts might make it difficult 
for the Biden administration to develop a comprehensive “Latin America strategy.” 
More than a one-size-fits-all approach, the region’s heterogeneity and ideological 
polarisation already call for a differentiated policy. Notwithstanding this, three spe-
cific challenges stand out on Biden’s agenda: the climate crisis; the situation in and 
around Venezuela; and, support for democracy and human rights. 
The Climate Crisis
The new US president’s pledge to champion the fight against climate change has 
been received with support from some Latin American presidents and social move-
ments, and with derisory looks from others. For example, during his campaign, 
Biden criticised Bolsonaro’s response to the Amazon fires and promised to rally the 
world to protect them. In turn, the Brazilian president was one of the last world 
leaders to recognise Biden’s victory and kept his support for Trump before, during, 
and after the campaign quite public – even for the voting-fraud accusations. 
Nevertheless, there was a somewhat softer tone on environmental issues in a 
recent message sent to the US by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However 
the note’s overall point was for Biden to stay away from Brazilian politics, and to 
find common ground in mutual interests instead. Parts of US civil society have al-
ready demanded the White House not sign any trade agreements with Brazil. This is 
due to previous talks on the matter that were held with the Trump administration. 
In general, the new US administration should not lose sight of the fact that a 
significant part of the region’s economy continues to depend heavily on fossil fuels’ 
use and export. Thus concrete alternatives are required, including financial and 
workforce-retraining support as well as technology transfer. 
Venezuela’s Quagmire
The Venezuelan situation continues to deteriorate, and there are no easy answers to 
its predicament. Most of the viable options for the international community appear 
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largely ineffective. The Biden administration has already declared that it will not 
be negotiating with Maduro anytime soon and will continue to recognise Guaidó 
as the legitimate president of Venezuela. Hence there is no fundamental strategic 
change in sight, outside of refraining from making irresponsible “all cards on the 
table” claims. Despite this, some unconfirmed sources claim that Biden is putting 
together a team to negotiate free and fair elections in exchange for lifting sanctions 
(Jairissati 2021). Still, so far, there have only been official comments on the more 
“strategic” or “intelligent” use of sanctions. Besides, Biden has promised to provide 
more financial support to Colombia as the country taking in the most Venezuelan 
immigrants. In that regard, his administration could encourage other Latin Ameri-
can countries to follow Colombia’s lead, welcoming and providing legal and human-
itarian support to more Venezuelans. 
Democracy and Human Rights
Latin American governments and civil society expect Biden to criticise authorita-
rian and human-rights-violation trends in the region. This will need to contrast 
with Trump’s one-sided approach, only criticising what he considered the “troika of 
tyranny” (Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela). In contrast, he kept silent about Bol-
sonaro, Alejandro Giammattei, Nayib Bukele, and other right-wing leaders’ abuses. 
Consequent policy also implies questioning the legitimacy of the secretary general 
of the Organization of American States, Luis Almagro, for advancing this one-sided 
tendency and his role in the delegitimisation of the Bolivian elections with insuffici-
ent and ultimately false evidence. Also, for Almagro’s unsubstantiated allegations 
that Maduro was behind the wave of legitimate social protests in the region in 2019. 
One of the challenges here as in many other regards is the lack of confluence 
among Latin American positions. Many of the region’s countries are internally and 
externally polarised around ideological axes, making the coordination of a joint 
stance around the defence of democracy rather unlikely. This division has already 
caused the disintegration of the Union of South American Nations, and the Com-
munity of Latin American and Caribbean States’ paralysis. Moreover, an extremely 
worrying development is that the current pandemic is putting democratic institu-
tions under even greater pressure. 
An excellent place to start would be to pressure the Colombian government 
to step up the implementation of the peace process, including protecting the lives 
of the social leaders and ex-combatants who are being systematically assassinated 
with no decisive action taken by the Duque government to prevent it -as well as 
other points of the peace agreement. Fortunately, it seems like the Biden adminis-
tration has started to act in this regard by asking the Colombian government for 
clarification on the matter. However, it remains to be seen whether the new US pre-
sident will be willing to pressure for concrete results beyond Duque’s predictable 
deflection attempts. 
Nevertheless, Latin American governments might be less inclined to accept 
dem ocracy lessons from the US after the Capitol insurrection and Trump’s acquittal 
in his second impeachment trial. Besides, for decades, the perception of a significant 
part of the region has been that Washington intervenes more according to its stra-
tegic and geopolitical interests than to advance democratic rule (Kurtenbach 2019). 
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Biden might face a similar problem when addressing the corruption problem in the 
region after Trump’s scandals. Due to the impunity shown in the Odebrecht case 
and others, this should not only be focused on the Northern Triangle as his plans 
suggest. In the anti-corruption fight it will be critical to strengthen and protect the 
autonomy of internal judiciaries. It would be a great signal for him to deliver on his 
promise to create a regional institution to fight corruption and rally and help coor-
dinate the multilateral work of state, non-state actors and international institutions 
including United Nations investigative commissions such as the one whose manda-
te was not renewed in Guatemala by former President Jimmy Morales. 
Quickly Changing National and Regional Paths 
COVID-19 has once again brought to the fore the structural weaknesses of the Latin 
American economies (CEPAL 2020b: 15). Economic growth is estimated to fall 9.1 
per cent, poverty levels have reached 37.3 per cent. Unemployment will amount 
to around 13.5 per cent, inequality has and will be further deepened, and external 
debt will increase by 9.3 per cent. Fifteen years of social progress and one decade of 
economic advancement risk receding entirely if decisive action is not taken imme-
diately (CEPAL 2020b: 15). Furthermore, the pandemic has shown the precarious 
state of the social security and healthcare systems across the region, and the job 
market’s high informality (affecting around 54 per cent of the workforce) (Blofield, 
Giambruno, and Filgueira 2020). Due to the problematic situation in host econo-
mies, remittances have also fallen. This drop is generally damaging for the region, 
particularly for the economies that depend on remittances the most (in Haiti, 33 
per cent of gross domestic product) (CEPAL 2020b: 18). Still, these numbers do not 
even account for the direct negative consequences of COVID-19 in 2021. 
There is also the question of how Latin American countries can counter the 
worsened recession and reprimarisation in their economies. These are caused 
partly by the free trade agreements (FTAs) signed with industrialised nations and 
in creas ed trade with China. In 2013, the percentage of primary products in Latin 
America exports to China (73 per cent) was higher than it was to the rest of the 
world (41 per cent) (Santana 2018). To counter these recession and reprimarisation 
trends, strengthened investment in research and development will be needed – as 
well as creating regional value chains (RVCs) to export more than just commodities 
to the global market. 
These RVCs can also bring forward the fight against the climate crisis. For ex-
ample, Ecuador exports the balsa wood used for wind turbines, Brazil manufactures 
the latter, and Chile is planning to invest heavily in wind energy (Osborn 2021). By 
combining these inputs much can be achieved in clean-energy procurement, as well 
vis-à-vis increasing intraregional value-added trade. These moves can improve job 
quality, decrease coal and oil dependence, and reduce the gigantic role commodities 
play in Latin American exports. 
In this challenging context, more Latin Americans may attempt to migrate to 
the US. Thus, it is actually in Biden’s interest to radically upgrade help to the re gion 
beyond the USD 4 billion promised to Central America. Light migration reform 
and the more humane treatment of immigrants will help, but again fall short with 
regards to the region’s structural needs. Migrants – and the region as a whole – will 
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need much more than the temporary suspension of heavy-handed detention. To be 
sure, how far the Biden administration can advance on these agendas will be facili-
tated by the Democrats’ advantageous position in Congress. 
Moreover, in international policy, Biden has not presented himself as an agent 
of profound change, beyond reversing Trump most problematic policies. It remains 
to be seen how much further he is willing to go than what he proudly refers to as 
his “brand” (Washington 2020). So far, it seems that his brand will not provide the 
answers that Latin America and the Caribbean need. Thus it will also be up to re-
gion al leaders to pressure the US for more support and solidarity, while diversifying 
in terms of willing partners and potential financers. However some researchers fear 
that there might not be any leading Latin American voices to shape the US agenda, 
which might leave the space open for Miami hardliners to fill the void (Long 2021). 
Beyond the US, any help and reinforced partnerships that the region receives and 
rallies – especially during this trying period – will be long remembered, and mark 
its insertion in an increasingly disordered multipolar world. 
Beyond colourful sea movements, the current political transitions in Latin 
America need to be examined in their comings and goings. Here certain examples 
might be in order: Some left-leaning governments are indeed returning to office. 
However, the  heavy-handed policies of right-wing leaders are also enjoying signifi-
cant popularity. Conservative governments like Colombia’s are implementing more 
progressive migration policies for Venezuelans, while also-conservative-led Chile 
deports them without regard for their ordeals. Further, the first round of Ecuadori-
an elections pitted, among other options, a pro-redistribution but still extractivist 
left against a more ecological one. In that framework of ideas, trend analyses and 
policies need to acknowledge these nuances. 
Accordingly, extra-regional actors need to understand this complexity if they 
are to support the advancement of the welfare state that social movements and 
some political actors are trying to manifest. In that regard, they can also contribute 
to actively countering the McCarthyism of those who see legitimate social protests 
as dangerous polarisation or altogether communist uprisings inspired by the Ve-
nezuelan government. To be sure, this will help to undermine the Latin American 
neo-patriotic, anti-globalist, far right which seeks to antagonise progressive reform 
in this way (Sanahuja and López Burian 2020). 
Pandemic Relief, COVID-19 Diplomacy, and the Multilateral 
Question
The biggest conundrum is whether the new US president and his government will 
help the region during and after the current pandemic, and if so how. In the worst 
nationalistic fashion, Trump hoarded respirators and other medical supplies during 
the virus’s first waves. Sadly, the same has happened with vaccines. The wealthiest 
countries have first ensured their supply and refused to open the patents for the 
poorest ones to produce them. They have also not redistributed or granted equal ac-
cess to existing ones. In light of that, a few – now more and more, in fact – low- and 
middle-income countries are cutting deals to obtain the more affordable Sputnik 
V. China has approved a new vaccine to supply to the “developing” world too. The 
Chinese also provided Latin American countries with respirators and other medical 
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supplies last year. As a result, they have strengthened diplomacy and perceptions of 
solidarity across the region – even despite the geopolitical resistance that the Asian 
country generates among governments and elites historically close to Washington. 
In this context what could Biden specifically do? For starters, he could:
 • Support freeing the vaccine patent, and back its regional production. 
 • Provide the PAHO and the World Health Organization’s (WHO) regional of-
fice with substantial funds and support. However, donations here will not be 
enough, the vaccine has to become a global public good.
 • Facilitate use of the International Monetary Fund’s special drawing rights to 
provide access to more cash for Latin American countries. However, this will 
only be effective for poverty relief if those funds do not go to the financial system 
but are directed instead towards social-protection programmes or purchasing 
vaccines. 
 • Radically increase foreign aid to and investment in the region in critical areas 
such as infrastructure, clean-energy transition, and agricultural development. 
Unfortunately, no steps have been taken so far in this direction. In this context, La-
tin America and the Caribbean countries can work more determinedly among them-
selves and with other countries from the Global South due to their shared interests 
in overcoming the pandemic and advancing their development interests.
Furthermore, Latin America can become a more important partner for the EU 
in the international arena because of shared values and the former’s championing 
of multilateralism. Although polarisation around democratic rules and within he-
mispheric multilateral institutions does not make the region an irrevocably reliable 
partner (Kurtenbach 2019), its civil society and parts of its political class do steadily 
strive to strengthen domestic and international institutions. Moreover, it will be 
up to the EU to step up joint actions, such as the Alliance for Multilateralism, and 
to take a more substantial interest in the region. For instance, during the pandem-
ic juncture, the EU could reflect this commitment by fast-tracking the sustainable 
loans needed in Latin America from international financial institutions. Another 
opportunity is advancing the democratisation of global governance via voting rights 
and backing Latin Americans for management positions within multilateral institu-
tions (Benner 2019). A widened and deepened partnership can help Latin America 
and the EU not become global bystanders in the US–China trade war, in institution-
al and normative global reforms, and in other geopolitical and economic playing 
fields. 
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